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Abstract
We consider customer joining behaviour for a system that consists of a FCFS
queue with Bernoulli feedback. A consequence of the feedback characteristic is
that the sojourn time of a customer already in the system depends on the joining
decisions taken by future arrivals to the system. By establishing stochastic order
results for coupled versions of the system, we prove the existence, and unique-
ness, of Nash equilibrium joining policies, and show that these are characterized
by (possibly randomized) threshold rules. We contrast the Nash rule with the
socially optimizing joining rule that minimizes the long-term expected average
sojourn time (or cost) per customer. The latter rule is characterized by a non-
randomized threshold, and we show that the Nash rule admits at least as many
customers into the system as the socially optimizing one.
Keywords: FCFS queue with Bernoulli feedback; coupling; Nash equilibrium; social
optimality
AMS: 90B22; 91A10; 60E15; 91A13; 91A14
1 Introduction
This paper considers the joining behaviour of customers into a First Come First Served
Bernoulli Feedback queueing system. Each arriving customer joins the system, or
balks, on the basis of the number of customers already present. It is assumed that cus-
tomers who join the system do not renege at any stage. An important consequence of
the Bernoulli feedback property is that the sojourn time of any customer who is already
∗Department of Mathematics, University of Bristol, University Walk, Bristol BS8 1TW, U.K.
†School of Economics, Mathematics, & Statistics, Birkbeck College, Malet Street, London WC1E
7HX, U.K.
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in the system may be affected by customer arrivals in the future. Joining behaviour of
customers to the system is considered in the context of the following two scenarios.
In the first, each customer compares their expected sojourn time (or cost) in the sys-
tem with some fixed cost parameter associated with balking, and makes the joining
decision that yields the smallest expected cost. Since this involves taking into account
the joining decisions taken by other customers, it is natural to consider the Nash equi-
librium as the appropriate characterization of behaviour. Our second scenario is one
in which the joining decision of each customer is selected by a centralized authority,
with the objective of minimizing long-term expected costs averaged across all cus-
tomers. In common with other literature on admission control into queues, we discuss
whether decentralized decision making can be as good as, or perhaps worse than, that
under centralized control, when judged according to the social criterion posed in our
problem.
Naor (1969) carried out one of the earliest studies of optimal customer joining
behaviour into single-server queueing systems. He assumes a constant holding cost per
customer per unit time and assumes that a fixed reward accrued to each customer in the
system upon completion of service (thus, in effect, a linear holding cost). He shows
that, within the class of (stationary) deterministic threshold policies, there exist unique
individually optimal and socially optimal joining rules that minimize the expected cost
to each customer and the long-run (expected) cost per unit time, respectively. Finally,
he also shows that the socially optimal threshold is a lower bound on the threshold that
is individually optimal.
Similar results have been established in a number of extensions to the above sys-
tem. For example, Yechiali (1971) considers the GI/M/1 system (with linear cost struc-
ture), and shows that, amongst all policies, there exists a non-randomized threshold
joining rule that is self-optimizing, from the point of view of each customer. He also
shows that in the class of stationary policies, the socially optimizing policy that mini-
mizes an average cost criterion, is also characterized by a non-randomized threshold.
Again the socially optimal threshold is seen to be a lower bound to the one that is
individually optimal. Yechiali (1972) establishes corresponding results for the GI/M/s
queue. However, Altman & Hassin (2002) argue that the individually optimal joining
policy for the M/G/1 queue does not exhibit the usual threshold structure, due to the
queue lengths giving an indication as to the residual time of the customer in service to
new arrivals at the system.
Using an approach based on uniformization (Lippman 1975), Lipmann & Stidham
(1977) derive results analogous to those of Naor and Yechiali for a model in which the
service rate is a bounded, concave increasing, function of the number of customers in
the system. Other relevant papers include Stidham (1978), where a convex holding cost
is assumed, and Johansen & Stidham (1980), where a stochastic input-output system
with a very general structure is considered. The survey article of Stidham (1985) and
the book of Hassin & Haviv (2003) provide useful overviews of the relevant literature.
A common feature of all the models cited above is that the time or cost of a par-
ticular customer already in the system is unaffected by the joining behaviour of future
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arrivals. This allows policies to be formulated that are optimal for each individual cus-
tomer. However, in feedback models, the sojourn time of a customer already in the
system depends on the joining decisions taken by future arrivals to the system. Nat-
ural applications of FCFS queueing systems with feedback arise, for example, in the
theory of telephone traffic (Taka´cs 1963); see Takagi (1991) and the references therein
for variations and extensions to the basic model. We can also think of this system as
a model for a single-line manufacturing process in which each job is independently
tested, and sent through the process again if a fault is discovered or the work done to
the job is deemed unsatisfactory (Peko¨z & Joglekar 2002). We can still define and con-
struct ’optimal’ joining rules for these models, but only if knowledge about the joining
behaviour of future arrivals can be assumed; thus the appropriate solution concept to
consider is that of the Nash equilibrium, and we discuss this in detail later in this paper.
Nash equilibrium joining rules for a ’single line’ queueing system have been exam-
ined by Altman & Shimkin (1998) in the context of the processor sharing discipline.
There it was assumed that the effective service rate to each customer in the queue,
ν(x) = µ(x)/x, is strictly decreasing in x (where x is the number in the system, and
µ(x) the corresponding service rate). For their system, they show that any candidate
Nash equilibrium policy is characterized by a threshold structure, that a Nash equilib-
rium policy always exists, and will be unique when the policy is symmetric, i.e. each
customer invokes exactly the same joining rule. This model was later extended to the
case of multi-class heterogeneous preferences in Ben-Shahar, Orda & Shimkin (2000),
in which the existence of the Nash equilibrium was also established.
The analysis of Altman & Shimkin (1998) can be modified and extended to deal
with the multiple-server retrial queue (Brooms 2000), and the FCFS queue where the
service rate is (strictly) decreasing in the number in the system (Brooms 2003). More
recently, the FCFS queue with service rate strictly increasing in the queue length was
analyzed in Brooms (2005). It was shown that, under the proviso that the joining
rule for each customer is such that the chance that they are admitted to the queue is a
non-increasing function of the queue length, there exists (at most) a finite number of
symmetric Nash equilibria, and that at least one of these does not invoke randomization
in its joining decisions. This should be contrasted with Altman & Shimkin (1998) in
which existence and uniqueness were established (but with no guarantee of it being
non-randomized) within the widest possible class of policies.
One of the difficulties in establishing the stochastic order relations required for
our analysis stems from having to keep track of the actual position of certain of the
customers in the system, due to the queue discipline; a similar difficulty is encountered
for some other systems with the FCFS discipline (Brooms 2003, Brooms 2005), but
not, for example, with processor sharing (Altman & Shimkin 1998), or retrial queues
(Brooms 2000). Another difficulty stems from the Bernoulli feedback characteristic.
A standard method for conducting sample path comparisons, it to generate coupled
realizations of the queueing process; the progress of a ’marked’ customer in each of
the two processes is monitored and stochastic order results are thus derived. Unless
considerable care is taken over the class of policies considered and over the type of
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coupling used, ’dominance’ across each and every pair of realizations is not achieved.
So, in addition to the game-theoretic results presented in this paper, our second main
contribution arises from the construction and use of apparently novel couplings in
order to prove the ancillary lemmas.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the formulation of our
model, a prescription of the joining rules to be used by customers, and a summary of
the main results, are presented. In Section 3, sample path comparisons for our queue-
ing process, and monotonicity results for the expected sojourn time in the system, as a
function of the entry queue length x, are established. Similar results are proved with
respect to the threshold value associated with symmetric threshold joining policies in
Section 4; we also prove a continuity result for the expected sojourn time with respect
to this threshold. We bring these results together to characterize the structure, and to
prove the existence and uniqueness of a certain symmetric Nash equilibrium joining
policy in Section 5. We also show that a certain socially optimizing policy can be
characterized by a non-randomized threshold, and show that this is, in fact, a lower
bound on the Nash threshold. We close the paper in Section 6, with some concluding
remarks.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The model
Consider a service system consisting of a single server queue (denoted by Q) with
Bernoulli Feedback and First Come First Served (FCFS) queue discipline. Assume
that each arriving customer joins the queue with a probability that depends only on
the observed queue length x in Q just prior to their arrival at the system, and allow
randomized decisions. A joining rule for an arriving customer is thus a sequence of
numbers {u(x)∈ [0, 1] : x= 0, 1, 2 . . . , B−1}, where B may be finite, or infinite; if
the queue length just prior to their arrival is x then the customer joins the system with
probability u(x) and otherwise balks (i.e. does not join).
More formally, consider a process that starts at time t = 0 with an arriving customer
C0 that joins Q. We denote the subsequent arriving customers by C1, C2, . . . and let
X(t) denote the number of customers in Q at time t, with initial state X(0) = x0.
Let T = {T1, T2, T3, . . .} denote a sequence of independent, identically distributed,
positive, continuous random variables, with finite expectation, which we interpret as
the successive inter-arrival times, and let W = {W1,W2,W3, . . .}, and W , denote
a sequence of independent, identically distributed, positive, continuous random vari-
ables, with finite expectation, which we interpret as the successive service times. The
arrival epochs (to the system) of successive customers C1, C2, C3, . . . are then given
by the sequence A = {A1, A2, A3, . . .}, where Ak = T1 + · · · + Tk, k = 1, 2, . . .
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and, at least until the queue is empty for the first time, the successive service com-
pletion epochs in Q are given by the sequence S = {S0, S1, S2, S3, . . .}, where Sk =
S0 +W1 + · · · +Wk, k = 1, 2, . . . (with appropriate modification thereafter). We
assume that, with probability 1, the arrival epochs and service completion epochs are
distinct.
Similarly, let U = {U1, U2, U3, . . .} denote a sequence of independent random vari-
ables, each of which has a uniform distribution on the interval (0, 1] and let F =
{F0, F1, F2, . . .} be a sequence of independent Bernoulli random variables with pa-
rameter p, so for each k = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . ., Fk = 1 with probability p ∈ (0, 1) and
Fk = 0 with probability 1 − p. We interpret the U ’s as the successive arrival joining
decision variables, so customer Ck joins Q if and only if Uk ≤ uk(X(Ak)), and inter-
pret the F ’s as the successive feedback decision variables, so at the completion of the
j-th service in Q after time t = 0, the customer that has just completed service is fed
back to the end of the queue in Q if Fj = 1 and otherwise departs the system if Fj = 0.
In an abuse of terminology, we shall sometimes use Q to refer to the process as well
as the queueing system itself; we shall refer to the number held in the system as the
queue size or length (thus referring to the total number of customers queueing up for,
and actually in, service). Under this model, the evolution of Q is completely deter-
mined by the initial queue size X(0), the collection of joining rules for each one of the
future customers {u1, u2, . . .}, the residual service time S0 of the customer (if any) in
service at Q at t = 0, and the values of the variables in the sequences T ,W ,U and F .
In particular, we assume {X(t) : t ≥ 0} is a left-continuous, piecewise constant pro-
cess, whose jumps, if any, occur at arrival epochs {Ak} or service completion epochs
{Sj}, so that at Sj a customer is still with the server, whereas at S+j the customer has
either left the system or been fed back to the end of the queue. The jumps are formally
described by the relations:
X(A+k ) = X(Ak) + 1{Uk ≤ uk(X(Ak))} k = 1, 2, 3, . . . (1)
X(S+j ) = X(Sj)− 1{Fj = 0} j = 0, 1, 2, . . . (2)
with appropriate modification if the buffer is full, or X(Sj) = 0, j = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
2.2 Individual joining rules and population policies
Let u denote the joining rule for a given customer. We are particularly interested in
the simple class of threshold joining rules under which a customer joins Q if the queue
size is below a given threshold value, balks if the queue size is above the threshold
value, and possibly randomizes between these actions if it equals the threshold value.
Let Z+ denote the set of integers {1, 2, 3, . . .} and let N denote Z+ ∪ {0}.
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For nonnegative integer L ∈ N and q ∈ [0, 1), we say a joining rule u is an [L, q]-
threshold rule if for x ∈ N
u(x) =

1 if x < L
q if x = L
0 if x > L
(3)
Associated with each [L, q]-threshold rule is a unique real value g = L + q. We refer
to g as the threshold value associated with the rule, and represent the rule itself more
compactly by [g].
For a population of customers arriving in the sequence C0, C1, C2, . . ., we call the
corresponding vector of customer joining rules a population joining policy and denote
it by pi = (u0, u1, u2, . . .). We let D∞ denote the class of non-increasing population
policies for which each component rule uk is such that uk(x) is non-increasing in x;
we let S∞ denote the class of symmetric population policies for which each of the
components rules uk are identical; and we let T∞ denote the class of threshold popu-
lation policies, for which each uk is a threshold joining rule. Observe that T∞ ⊂ D∞.
If all customers adopt the same joining rule u then we denote the resulting popula-
tion joining policy pi = (u, u, u, . . .) ∈ S∞ by u∞; similarly, if all customers use the
same threshold joining rule [g] we denote the resulting population joining policy by
pi = [g]∞.
2.3 Main Results
In the following sections, we prove a number of stochastic order results pertaining to
the behaviour of the expected sojourn time of a customer in the system. Apart from
being of interest in their own right, these results will be used to establish the existence,
uniqueness, and structure of Nash equilibrium population joining policies for an asso-
ciated stationary game.
Let vk(x, β, pi), x∈N, be the sojourn time of Ck in Q, given that at its arrival, x cus-
tomers were already present in the system, the residual service time of the customer
at the server is β > 0, and that future arrivals adhere to the decision rules inferred by
pi. Define Vk(x, β, pi) to be the expected value of vk(x, β, pi). When the service time
has an exponential distribution, the expected sojourn time of a customer that joins
the queue does not depend on the residual service time (if any), and we simply write
vk(x, pi) and Vk(x, pi) respectively.
Note: indexing of entry queue sizes of the form x ∈ N, x = 0, 1, . . ., or x = 1, 2, . . .
are to be understood as running up to B − 1 whenever B is finite. Also, the interval
[0, B) is interpreted to mean [0, B] if B is finite, and [0,∞) if B is infinite.
Our main results are listed in the rest of this section. Theorems 1 to 4 characterize
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the dependence of the expected sojourn time on both x and g, and are mostly proved
by invoking couplings of a non-trivial nature. The game-theoretic results of Theorems
5 and 6 are proved using a combination of Theorems 1-4, but under the proviso that
the total expected time spent at the server for a customer in Q is less than the ’cost’ of
balking from the system.
Theorem 1 Consider a GI/G/1 Bernoulli feedback system and let pi ∈ D∞ be any
non-increasing population joining policy. Then, for each x = 1, 2, . . . and β > 0,
V (x+ 1, β, pi)− V (x, β, pi) ≥ (1− p)E(W ).
The specialization of this result to the case of exponential service times can be found
in Corollary 3.1. Theorem 1 is somewhat less general than its counterpart in Altman
& Shimkin (1998) in that pi is restricted to lie in D∞. The class D∞ infers that there
is less chance that each customer actually joins the system as the queue length there
increases. Under additional assumptions on the arrival and departure processes, we
can extend our result to another class of policies.
Theorem 2 Consider an M/M/1 Bernoulli feedback system and let pi ∈ S∞ be any
symmetric population joining policy. Then, for each x = 0, 1, 2, . . ., V (x + 1, pi) −
V (x, pi) ≥ (1− p)E(W ).
Theorem 3 Consider a GI/G/1 Bernoulli feedback system and let [g]∞ and [g˜]∞ be
symmetric threshold population joining policies with 0 ≤ g < g˜ and g˜ ∈ [0, B).
(i) Suppose g˜ ≤ 1. Then V (0, [g˜]∞) = V (0, [g]∞), and for each x = 1, 2, . . . and
β > 0, V (x, β, [g˜]∞) = V (x, β, [g]∞).
(ii) Suppose g ≥ 1. Then there exists δ0 > 0 such that V (0, [g˜]∞) − V (0, [g]∞) ≥ δ0,
and for each x = 1, 2, . . . and β > 0, there exists δx > 0 such that V (x, β, [g˜]∞) −
V (x, β, [g]∞) ≥ δx.
Theorem 4 Consider a GI/G/1 Bernoulli feedback system and let [g]∞ be a symmet-
ric threshold population joining policy with g > 0. Then V (0, [g]∞) is a continuous
function of g, and, for each x = 1, 2, . . . and β > 0, V (x, β, [g]∞) is a continuous
function of g ∈ [0, B).
Theorem 5 Consider aGI/M/1 Bernoulli feedback system and assume that attention
is restricted to the class D∞ of non-increasing population joining policies.
(i) If pi = (u0, u1, u2, . . . , . . .) ∈ D∞ is a Nash equilibrium population joining policy,
then each uk is a threshold joining rule (with finite threshold).
(ii) There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium population joining policy pi∗ =
(g∗, g∗, g∗, . . .) = [g∗]∞ in the class of policies D∞.
Theorem 6 Consider an M/M/1 Bernoulli feedback system.
(i) If pi = u∞ ∈ S∞ is a Nash equilibrium population joining policy, then u is a
threshold joining rule (with finite threshold).
(ii) There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium population joining policy pi∗ =
(g∗, g∗, g∗, . . .) = [g∗]∞.
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3 Monotonicity in the queue length x
3.1 Monotonicity for a GI/G/1 system
We first consider a GI/G/1 Bernoulli feedback queueing system where each potential
customer uses a joining rule which is a non-increasing function of the queue size just
prior to their arrival. Let x denote the queue size upon joining. We show that, for
x ≥ 1, the expected sojourn time of a joining customer is a strictly increasing function
of x.
Without loss of generality, we focus on a marked customer C that joins the queue
at time t = 0. For k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , , we assume each successive potential customer,
Ck, say, arrives at corresponding epoch Ak, and finds a queue of size X(Ak). Ck has
the option of either joining the queue or departing the system, and joins the queue
with probability uk(X(Ak)), where each uk(x) is a (possibly different) non-increasing
function of x. Note that the presence of a finite buffer B can be incorporated by taking
uk(x) = 0 for x ≥ B.
Let v(x, β, pi) denote the sojourn time for customer C who joins the queueing system,
when the queue size just prior to arrival is x ≥ 1, the population joining policy (i.e.
the set of joining rules for later arriving potential customers) is pi = (u1, u2, u3. . . . , ),
and when the residual service time for the customer currently in service at time t = 0
is S0 = β > 0. Let V (x, β, pi) be the expected value of this quantity.
To compare v(x, β, pi) with v(x + 1, β, pi), we look at path-wise comparisons of cou-
pled realizations of two queueing processes, say Q and Q˜, in which marked customers
C (resp. C˜) join the queue at time t = 0 when there are already x (resp. x + 1) cus-
tomers in the queue, the population joining policy is pi and the current residual service
time is β. We say that at each time t a customer in the Q process is level with a cus-
tomer in the Q˜ process if both have the same position (first, second, third etc.,) in their
respective queues, and we say one customer is ahead of (resp. behind) the other if it
has a position nearer (resp. further from) its server. We show that for each sample path
in the coupled processes, the customer who joins with x in the system leaves either at
the same epoch or at least one service completion before the customer who joins with
x + 1 in the system. Moreover, this second possibility happens on a set of positive
probability, so that V (x, β, pi) < V (x+ 1, β, pi).
The coupling we use here is designed to ensure that both C and C˜ make the same
number of visits to the server in the coupled systems. We saw from the model descrip-
tion in section 2.1 that the evolution of Q (and similarly Q˜) is completely specified by
the sequence of successive inter-arrival times T , service times W , population joining
policy pi, joining decision random variables U and feedback random variables F . The
coupling we use is defined in terms of these variables as follows:
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Coupling 1 (i) Consider two processes Q and Q˜ with X(0) = x > 0 and X˜(0) =
y > 0. Couple the systems so that they have the same initial residual lifetime and so
that, taken in the natural order, they have the same sequence of inter-arrival times, the
same sequence of service times, the arriving customers use the same sequence of join-
ing rules and the joining decision random variables take the same sequence of values.
Formally, this means we set S0 = S˜0 = β, T = T˜ , W = W˜ , pi = pi and U = U˜ .
(ii) Now couple the feedback decision variables as follows. For r = 1, 2, 3 let Fr =
{Fr,1, Fr,2, Fr,3 . . .} denote mutually independent sequences of independent Bernoulli
random variables, each with parameter p.
Use the sequence of values in F1 to determine both the successive feedback deci-
sions for customer C in Q and the successive feedback decisions for C˜ in Q˜, so, for
example, both C and C˜ are fed back after their first service if and only if F1,1 ≤ p.
Thus both C and C˜ are fed back exactly the same number of times in both processes.
Use the sequence of values inF2 to determine the successive feedback decisions for all
other customers in Q. Thus, the first customer in Q other than C to complete service
is fed back if and only if F2,1 ≤ p, the second is fed back if and only if F2,2 ≤ p, etc.
Now consider the other customers in Q˜. By construction, the two processes Q and
Q˜ have the same service completion epochs, at least until one or other is empty for the
first time. During this period, couple the feedback decision for each customer other
than C˜ to be exactly the same as that for the corresponding customer completing at
the same time in Q, except for customers (other than C˜) who complete service at the
same time as C. Say there is such a customer who completes service in Q˜ at the same
moment that C completes its k-th service in Q. Denote this customer by H˜k and de-
note by Hk that customer in Q (if any) which is level with C˜ at that moment. If such
a customer Hk exists, define the the feedback decision for H˜k to be the same as the
(already assigned) next feedback decision for Hk in Q. If there is no customer level
with C˜ at that moment, then define the feedback decision for H˜k using the value of
the k-th variable in the sequence F3. Once the two processes no longer have the same
service completion epochs, the feedback decisions can be assigned arbitrarily. ¤
Note that under Coupling 1 a customer opposite C may depart even though C is fed
back, so there may be epochs s when X(s) > X˜(s). As well as showing how the
relative positions of C and C˜ are maintained between their service completion epochs,
the next Lemma shows that if X˜(0) = X(0)+1 then X(s) can never exceed X˜(s)+1.
Lemma 3.1 Consider realizations of the two processes Q and Q˜ under Coupling 1
with y = x + 1, and assume the population follows some non-increasing population
policy pi ∈ D∞. Let τ denote the set of epochs at which C or C˜ (or both) complete
a service and neither have yet departed, and let s and t denote successive epochs in
9
C H˜k
C˜Hk
Hk
C
C˜
Figure 1: A possible realization of Q and Q˜ just prior (L.H.S.) and just after (R.H.S.)
C is fed back for the k-th time. C and H˜k are in service on the L.H.S. The feedback
decisions for C and C˜ remain coupled throughout. The feedback decision for H˜k is
coupled with that of Hk if Hk is present, otherwise it is chosen independently; in the
diagram neither are fed back. The next feedback decisions for the other customers in
Q˜ are coupled with those for the parallel customers in Q, and will be reassigned if they
are fed back.
τ ∪ {0}. Then
(i) The positions of C and C˜ relative to each other do not change in (s, t).
(ii) If X˜(s+) ≥ X(s+) then X˜(t) ≥ X(t).
(iii) If X(s+) = X˜(s+) + 1 then X(t) ≤ X˜(t) + 1.
Proof
Consider the processes in the interval (s, t), where any feedback decisions following
the first service completion have been implemented by time s+, but those following
the second service completion have not yet been implemented at t (by virtue of the
’left-continuity’ of the queue-length process). During the interval, the composition of
each queue changes only at arrival or service completion epochs.
(i): At service completion epochs, the coupling ensures that customers make the same
feedback decision in both processes, so the positions of C and C˜ relative to each other
do not change. At arrival epochs, the arriving customers join behind C and C˜, so
cannot affect their relative positions until the next epoch in τ . Thus the positions of C
and C˜ relative to each other do not change in (s, t).
(ii) and (iii): At service completion epochs, the coupling ensures that the relative queue
sizes remain unchanged. At arrival epochs when the queue lengths are equal, the
coupling of the joining decision variables ensures that the same joining decision is
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taken in both processes. At arrival epochs when one queue is smaller than the other,
the fact that the joining decision rule is a non-increasing function of the size of the
queue, together with the coupling and relation (1), ensures that either the same joining
decision is taken in both processes or the arrival joins the queue in the process with
the smaller queue but does not join in the process with the larger queue. Thus the
difference in the queue sizes can only decrease during (s, t) and once the queue sizes
are equal, they remain equal. In particular, if X(s+) = X˜(s+) + 1 then either X(t) =
X˜(t) or X(t) = X˜(t) + 1, so in either case X(t) ≤ X˜(t) + 1. ¤
Lemma 3.2 Consider realizations of the two processes Q and Q˜ under Coupling 1
with y = x + 1, and assume the population follows some non-increasing population
policy pi ∈ D∞. Let K denote the common number of visits both C and C˜ make to
the server in each realization, and let s1, . . . , sK and s˜1, . . . , s˜K denote the service
completion epochs for C and C˜ respectively. Then X˜(sk) ≥ X(sk) and s˜k ≥ sk for
k = 1, . . . , K.
Proof
For k = 1, . . . , K, let Pk denote the proposition: X˜(sk) ≥ X(sk) and s˜k ≥ sk.
First assume K = 1. At t = 0+, C has x other customers ahead of it in Q while
C˜ has x+ 1 customers ahead of it in Q˜, so the position of C in Q is one ahead of that
of C˜ in Q˜. From Lemma 3.1, these relative positions are maintained until C completes
service, so C leaves the system exactly one service completion epoch before C˜. More-
over, X˜(0+) = X(0+) + 1 > X(0+) so again from Lemma 3.1 X˜(s1) ≥ X(s1). Thus
P1 is true.
Now assume Pk is true for some k = 1, . . . , K − 1 for K > 1. Since k < K,
both C and C˜ are fed back after their k-th service. Now C is either level with C˜ at
sk or C is ahead of C˜ at sk. If C is ahead of C˜ at sk, then there may or may not be a
customer in Q level with C˜ at sk. If there is a customer in Q level with C˜ at sk, then
that customer may or may not be fed back at its next service. There are then four cases
to consider.
Case 1: [C is level with C˜ at sk].
Since C is level with C˜ at sk and s˜k ≥ sk, both C and C˜ are fed back together at sk.
Since X˜(sk) ≥ X(sk) and C was fed back with C˜ at sk, C is level with or ahead of
C˜ after being fed back, and X˜(s+k ) ≥ X(s+k ). Lemma 3.1 then implies that the next
epoch in τ occurs at sk+1, that C is still either level with or ahead of C˜ at that point
and that X˜(sk+1) ≥ X(sk+1). Finally, C˜ had completed no more than k services at s+k
so it must have completed no more than k + 1 services at s+k+1, so s˜k+1 ≥ sk+1.
Case 2: [C is ahead of C˜ at sk and there is no customer in Q opposite C˜ at sk].
From the fact that there is no customer opposite C˜ in Q when C completes service, it
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follows immediately that: (i) X˜(sk) > X(sk), (ii) C must be level with or ahead of
C˜ after being fed back, and (iii) the feedback decision for the customer H˜k in Q˜ who
completes service at sk is determined by the corresponding value in the sequence F3,
independent of the realization for Q. Since X˜(sk) > X(sk), we have X˜(s+k ) ≥ X(s+k )
whether H˜k departs or is fed back. Since C is level with or ahead of C˜ at s+k , Lemma
3.1 implies that the next epoch in τ is at sk+1, that C is still level with or ahead of C˜ at
that point, and that X˜(sk+1) ≥ X(sk+1). Since C was ahead of C˜ at sk and s˜k ≥ sk,
C˜ must have completed at least one less service than C at s+k , so it must still have
completed at least one less service than C at s+k+1, giving s˜k+1 > sk+1.
Case 3: [C is ahead of C˜ at sk, Hk is opposite C˜ at sk and is fed back at its next
service].
Since C is ahead of C˜ at sk then, together with s˜k > sk, this implies that C˜ must
have completed say (r − 1) services at s+k , where (r − 1) < k. Since C is ahead of
C˜ at sk, there is a customer H˜k 6= C˜ in Q˜ who completes service at sk and whose
feedback decision is coupled to be the same as that for Hk, i.e. H˜k is also fed back at
s+k . Thus X˜(s
+
k ) ≥ X(s+k ). Since there was a customer level with C˜ at sk, C is now
behind C˜ after the feedback. Lemma 3.1 then implies that the next epoch in τ occurs
when C˜ completes service at s˜r and that X˜(s˜r) ≥ X(s˜r). At s˜+r , C˜ has completed
r ≤ k < K services, so both C˜ and Hk are fed back, giving X˜(s˜+r ) ≥ X(s˜+r ). Since
X˜(s˜r) ≥ X(s˜r), C is now ahead of C˜ after the feedback. Lemma 3.1 then implies that
the next epoch in τ occurs when C completes service at sk+1, that C is still ahead of
C˜ at that point, and that X˜(sk+1) ≥ X(sk+1). Since C˜ had completed r ≤ k services
at s˜+r and has not completed any more services by sk+1, we have s˜k+1 > sk+1.
Case 4: [C is ahead of C˜ at sk, Hk is opposite C˜ at sk and departs at its next ser-
vice].
Since H˜k now departs at sk while C is fed back, we have X(s+k ) ≤ X˜(s+k ) + 1 so
either X(s+k ) ≤ X˜(s+k ) or X(s+k ) = X˜(s+k ) + 1. Since there was a customer level
with C˜ at sk, C is now behind C˜ after the feedback. Let r be as in Case 3. Lemma
3.1 now implies that the next epoch in τ occurs when C˜ completes service at s˜r, and
that X(s˜r) ≤ X˜(s˜r) + 1, so either X(s˜r) ≤ X˜(s˜r) or X(s˜r) = X˜(s˜r) + 1. At s˜+r ,
C˜ has completed r ≤ k < K services and so is fed back, while Hk departs just like
H˜k, so either X(s˜+r ) ≤ X˜(s˜+r ) − 1 or X(s˜+r ) = X˜(s˜+r ), i.e. X˜(s˜+r ) ≥ X(s˜+r ). Thus
C˜ is either fed back level with C or behind C. Lemma 3.1 now implies that the next
epoch in τ is at sk+1, that C is still level with or ahead of C˜ at that point, and that
X˜(sk+1) ≥ X(sk+1). Since C˜ had completed less than k services at s+k and has only
completed one service between sk and sk+1, it has completed at most k + 1 services
by s+k+1, and so s˜k+1 ≥ sk+1.
Thus in all cases Pk implies Pk+1. Since P1 is true (using a similar argument for
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establishing P1 when K = 1), the result follows by induction. ¤
Theorem 1
Consider a GI/G/1 Bernoulli feedback system and let pi ∈ D∞ be any non-increasing
population joining policy. Then, for each x = 1, 2, . . . and β > 0, V (x + 1, β, pi) −
V (x, β, pi) ≥ (1− p)E(W ).
Proof
Consider realizations of the two processes Q and Q˜ as in Coupling 1. Assume that
there are initially x customers ahead of C in Q and y = x+1 customers ahead of C˜ in
Q˜ and that customers in both Q and Q˜ are using the same non-increasing population
joining policy pi ∈ D∞. From Lemma 3.2, C completes its first service at s1 (one
customer ahead of C˜), and completes all its remaining services either level with C˜ or at
least one customer ahead. The probability that C (and C˜) depart after just one service
is (1 − p), and the expected extra time C˜ spends in Q˜ in that case is E(W ). Thus,
taking expectation over all possible realizations, we have V (x+1, β, pi)−V (x, β, pi) ≥
(1− p)E(W ). ¤
3.2 Monotonicity for a GI/M/1 system
When the service time has an exponential distribution, the residual service time of a
customer in service at an arrival epoch has exactly the same exponential distribution as
the service time of a customer starting service at that point. Thus the expected sojourn
time of a customer that joins the queue does not depend on the residual service time
of the customer (if any) in service on joining. In this case we can write V (x, pi) for
the expected sojourn time for customer C when the queue size on joining is x and the
population joining policy is pi = (u1, u2, u3. . . .).
Corollary 3.1
Consider a GI/M/1 Bernoulli feedback system and let pi ∈ D∞ be any non-increasing
population joining policy. Then, for each x = 0, 1, 2, . . ., V (x + 1, pi) − V (x, pi) ≥
(1− p)E(W ).
Proof
The proof for x = 1, 2, . . . follows directly from Theorem 1 since the expected sojourn
times are independent of β. Moreover, the result for x = 0 can be proved in exactly
the same way as the results for x > 0 in section 3.1, since we can now arrange the
coupling so that the residual service time of the customer in service in Q˜ at t = 0 has
exactly the same value as the service time of the customer joining and entering service
in Q at t = 0. ¤
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3.3 Monotonicity for an M/M/1 system
When the arrival process forms a stationary Poisson process we can extend the class of
population joining rules for which Theorem 1 applies. Consider an M/M/1 Bernoulli
feedback system where potential customers all use the same joining rule u, where u(x)
is a general (not necessarily non-increasing) function of the queue size x on arrival. We
again show that the expected sojourn time of a customer that joins a non-empty queue
is a strictly increasing function of the queue size on joining.
Again let v(x, pi) denote the sojourn time for customer C when the queue size on
joining is x ≥ 1, when the symmetric population joining policy (for arriving potential
customers) is pi = u∞, and let V (x, pi) be the expectation of this quantity. Again we
compare v(x, pi) with v(x + 1, pi), by looking at path-wise comparisons of coupled
realizations of two queueing processes, say Q and Q˜, in which marked customers C
(resp. C˜) join the queue at t = 0 when there are already x (resp. x + 1) customers in
the queue.
The coupling we use is, perhaps, more complex than Coupling 1, but is again de-
signed to ensure that both C and C˜ make the same number of visits to the server in the
coupled systems.
For fixed u, the evolution of Q˜ is completely specified as before by the sequence of
successive inter-arrival times T˜ , service times W˜ , joining decision random variables U˜
and feedback random variables F˜ . The coupled evolution of Q can then be described
informally as follows: Consider a realization of Q˜ in which C˜ makes K visits to the
server. For k = 1, 2, 3, . . . let s˜1, . . . , s˜K denote the corresponding service comple-
tion epochs of C˜. We ”freeze” the process Q until C˜ is level with C and then couple
the two processes to have the same arrival epochs, service completion epochs, arrival
decision variables and feedback decision variables until both C and C˜ complete their
first service. By construction, when C˜ is fed back for the first time, there are at least
as many customers ahead of it as there are ahead of C when it is fed back for the first
time. To extend the realization until the next service completion epoch for C, again
”freeze” the process Q until C˜ is again level with C and then re-couple them until both
C and C˜ complete their next service. This procedure can be continued iteratively until
both C and C˜ depart.
We can define this coupling more formally as follows:
Coupling 2
Let s1, . . . , sK and s˜1, . . . , s˜K be the successive service completion epochs of cus-
tomers C and C˜, respectively, and set s0 = s˜0 := 0. For some k ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1},
assume that we have constructed Q up to the epoch s+k , X˜(s˜k) ≥ X(sk) and s˜k ≥ sk.
Set b = X˜(s˜k)−1−(X(sk)−1) = X˜(s˜k)−X(sk), which for k ≥ 1 (resp. k = 0) rep-
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resents the difference between the number ahead of C and the number ahead of C˜ as
they are fed back for the k-th time (resp. as they join their respective systems at time 0).
Now observe Q˜ from s˜+k until b services have taken place and then couple Q with
it. Let r1, r2, . . . denote the arrival epochs of successive customers in C˜ after s˜k and
t1, t2, . . . the successive service completion epochs. Assume that there have been e
arrivals and f services in Q˜ prior to s˜+k , and that there are a arrivals and b service
completions in Q˜ in the interval (s˜k, tb] and c arrivals and d service completions in
the interval (tb, s˜k+1], so d = X(s+k ) and tb+d = s˜k+1. Then starting at time s+k ,
we construct the realization of Q over the interval (sk, sk + tb+d − tb] as follows. If
c > 0, then there are taken to be c arrivals in Q in this interval, with arrival epochs
sk+ ra+1− tb, . . . , sk+ ra+c− tb and joining decision parameters Ue+a+1, . . . , Ue+a+c.
There are taken to be d service completions in Q in this interval, with service com-
pletion epochs sk + tb+1 − tb, . . . , sk + tb+d − tb and feedback decision parameters
Ff+b+1, . . . , Ff+b+d.
The coupling after sK is arbitrary.
¤
unmarked customer
service epoch for
arrival epoch
marked customer
service epoch for
KEY:
sk sk+1 sk+2
s˜k s˜k+1 s˜k+2
tbk tbk+1
Figure 2: Possible realizations of Q (bottom) and Q˜ (top) under Coupling 2. The dia-
gram shows the time horizons near the k-th service transitions of the marked customer
in the two processes. The service epochs for which C˜ becomes level with C after the
k-th and (k + 1)-th services of C˜ are given by tbk and tbk+1 , respectively. The arrival
epochs in Q˜ closest to tbk and tbk+1 are also depicted.
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Theorem 2
Consider an M/M/1 Bernoulli feedback system and let pi ∈ S∞ be any symmetric
population joining policy. Then, for each x = 0, 1, 2, . . ., V (x + 1, pi) − V (x, pi) ≥
(1− p)E(W ).
Proof
Consider realizations of the two processes Q and Q˜ under Coupling 2. Assume that
there are initially x customers ahead of C in Q and x + 1 customers ahead of C˜ in Q˜
and that all customers in both Q and Q˜ use the decision rule inferred by the symmetric
policy pi ∈ S∞.
For k = 1, . . . , K, let Pk denote the proposition: X˜(s˜k) ≥ X(sk) and s˜k ≥ sk.
Assume that K > 1 and that Pk holds for some k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}.
Due to the coupling, the position of C in Q at s+k is exactly the same as that of C˜ in Q˜
at t+b and their relative positions stay the same over the respective intervals (sk, sk+1]
and (tb, s˜k+1]. The last service completion in Q˜ in the interval (tb, s˜k+1] occurs when C˜
completes its next service, so C completes its next service at the corresponding epoch
and sk+1 = sk + tb+d − tb. At that point C is either fed back in the same way as C˜ if
k + 1 < K or C departs like C˜ if k + 1 = K.
The arrival, service completion, and feedback processes, forQ over the interval (sk, sk+
tb+d − tb] completely mirror those in Q˜ over the interval (tb, tb+d]. However, the num-
ber X˜(t+b ) in Q˜ at t+b is, by construction, at least as great as X(s+k ) in Q. Furthermore,
consider any t ∈ (0, tb+d − tb). Then while X˜(tb + t) > X(sk + t), the actual queue
size dependent joining decision in Q may differ from the corresponding decision in Q˜;
however, if for some t∗ ∈ (0, tb+d− tb) the queue sizes are the same (i.e. X˜(tb+ t∗) =
X(sk + t
∗)), then the joining decisions will be the same for all t ∈ [t∗, tb+d − tb),
and hence the queue sizes will stay equal over the corresponding intervals in Q and Q˜.
Thus, by construction, X˜(s˜k+1) ≥ X(sk+1). Finally, by assumption, s˜k ≥ sk and by
construction tb ≥ s˜k, so that s˜k+1 = tb+d = tb+(tb+d− tb) ≥ sk+(tb+d− tb) = sk+1.
Thus Pk+1 also holds.
By construction, X˜(s˜0) = X˜(0) = x + 1 > x = X(0) = X(s0), C starts b = 1
customer ahead of C˜ in their respective systems, and completes its first service at
s1 = s˜1 − t1 where t1 is the service completion epoch of the first customer served in
Q˜ after s+0 . Using a similar argument to the one in the preceding paragraph, it also
follows that X˜(s˜1) ≥ X(s1). Thus P1 holds here (and in the case where K = 1).
Hence, and in particular, s˜K ≥ sK .
The probability that C (and C˜) depart after just one service is (1 − p), and the ex-
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pected extra time C˜ spends in Q˜ in that case is E(W ).
Now, for each k, the memoryless property of the Exponential distribution implies that
the value ra+1 − tb used in constructing the arrival epochs for the interval (sk, sk+1)
is again an independent observation from the same Exponential inter-arrival distribu-
tion. Thus, when we take expectation over all possible realizations of Q˜ the coupling
also generates an expectation over all possible realizations of Q with just the right
distributions for the inter-arrival (and service) times. Thus V (x + 1, pi) − V (x, pi) ≥
(1− p)E(W ). ¤
4 Monotonicity and continuity in the threshold g
In this section we again consider a GI/G/1 Bernoulli feedback queueing system but
now assume all customers use the same threshold joining rule [L, q]. Recall from sec-
tion 2.2 that the rule can be written in compact form as [g], where g = L + q. We
consider the dependence of the expected sojourn time on the joining rule and show
that it is a continuous function of g, which is constant for g ∈ [0, 1], and is strictly
increasing for g ≥ 1.
To motivate the population joining rule, consider what would happen if, instead of join-
ing the feedback queue, customers could join an alternative queueing system where the
expected sojourn time was fixed at θ. We assume customers always join the feedback
system when it is empty on arrival. However, if the queue size on arrival is x ≥ 1,
we assume that each arriving customer joins the feedback queue only if their expected
sojourn time is less than the fixed sojourn time in the alternative queue. In this case,
the results of the previous section mean that each customer will use a threshold joining
rule. Our focus here is on the behaviour of the expected sojourn time of an individual
customer that does join the feedback queue when all the other customers are using the
same threshold joining rule [g].
Now let g = L + q and g˜ = L˜ + q˜ denote the threshold values for two threshold
joining rules with g < g˜, so that either L < L˜ or L = L˜ and q < q˜. Let v(x, β, [g]∞)
(resp. v(x, β, [g˜]∞)) denote the sojourn time for a customer who joins when there are
already x ≥ 1 customers in the system, when all other customers are using joining rule
[g] (resp.[g˜]) and the customer in service on joining has residual service time β. Let
the expected value of v(x, β, [g]∞) (resp. v(x, β, [g˜]∞)) be denoted by V (x, β, [g]∞)
(resp. V (x, β, [g˜]∞)).
To compare v(x, β, [g]∞) and v(x, β, [g˜]∞), we again compare coupled realizations
of two processes. We show that in the coupled processes the customer who joins the
system in which customers use [g] leaves either at the same epoch or at least one ser-
vice completion epoch before the customer who joins the system in which customers
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use [g˜]. We then show that this second possibility happens on a set of positive proba-
bility, so that V (x, β, [g˜]∞) > V (x, β, [g]∞).
Assume that there are initially x customers ahead of both C in Q and C˜ in Q˜. As-
sume also that all other customers in Q use the same threshold joining policy pi = [g]∞
and all other customers in Q˜ use the same threshold joining policy pi = [g˜]∞, where
g˜ > g.
Lemma 4.1 Consider realizations of the two processes Q and Q˜ under Coupling 1
with y = x. Let τ denote the set of epochs at which C or C˜ (or both) complete a
service and neither have yet departed, and let s and t denote successive epochs in
τ ∪ {0}. Then
(i) the positions of C and C˜ relative to each other do not change in (s, t)
(ii) if X˜(s+) ≥ X(s+) then X˜(t) ≥ X(t)
(iii) if X(s+) = X˜(s+) + 1 then X(t) ≤ X˜(t) + 1.
Proof
The argument is exactly the same as that for Lemma 3.1, except for the part relating to
the changes in the respective queue sizes at arrival epochs.
Under the given policies a customer arriving in Q at z when the queue size is x joins if
and only if either x < L or x = L and U ≤ q, and a customer arriving in Q˜ at z when
the queue size is x joins if and only if either x < L˜ or x = L˜ and U ≤ q˜, where either
L < L˜, or L = L˜ and q < q˜.
If X(z) < X˜(z), then X(z+) ≤ X˜(z+), whatever the respective joining decisions.
If X(z) = X˜(z), then the customer will join in Q if and only if either X(z) < L or
X(z) = L and U ≤ q. Since X(z) = X˜(z) and either L < L˜ or L = L˜ and q < q˜,
the customer joining in Q implies either X˜(z) < L˜ or X˜(z) = L˜ and U ≤ q˜, so the
customer must also join in Q˜. Thus, at each arrival epoch in (s+, t), X(z) ≤ X˜(z)
implies X(z+) ≤ X˜(z+), giving (ii).
Similarly, if X(z) = X˜(z)+1, then the customer will join in Q only if the customer in
Q˜ also joins, so the customers either join in both queues (giving X(z+) = X˜(z+)+1),
neither queue, or just in Q˜ (giving X(z+) = X˜(z+)). Combined with the argument
used to establish (ii), this gives (iii). ¤
Lemma 4.2 Consider realizations of the two processes Q and Q˜ under Coupling 1
with y = x. Let K denote the common number of visits both C and C˜ make to
the server in each realization, and let s1, . . . , sK and s˜1, . . . , s˜K denote the service
completion epochs for C and C˜ respectively. Then X˜(sk) ≥ X(sk) and s˜k ≥ sk for
k = 1, . . . , K.
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Proof
For k = 1, . . . , K, let Pk denote the proposition: X˜(sk) ≥ X(sk) and s˜k ≥ sk.
First assume K = 1. At t = 0, C and C˜ are level with x customers ahead of them.
From Lemma 4.1, these relative positions are maintained until C completes service, so
s1 = s˜1. Moreover, X˜(0+) = X(0+) so again from Lemma 4.1 (ii), X˜(s1) ≥ X(s1).
Thus P1 is true.
The proof for the case K > 1 follows in exactly the same way as in Lemma 3.2,
except that we invoke Lemma 4.1 instead of Lemma 3.1. ¤
Theorem 3 Consider a GI/G/1 Bernoulli feedback system and let [g]∞ and [g˜]∞ be
symmetric threshold population joining policies with 0 ≤ g < g˜ and g˜ ∈ [0, B).
(i) Suppose g˜ ≤ 1. Then V (0, [g˜]∞) = V (0, [g]∞), and for each x = 1, 2, . . . and
β > 0, V (x, β, [g˜]∞) = V (x, β, [g]∞).
(ii) Suppose g ≥ 1. Then there exists δ0 > 0 such that V (0, [g˜]∞) − V (0, [g]∞) ≥ δ0,
and for each x = 1, 2, . . . and β > 0, there exists δx > 0 such that V (x, β, [g˜]∞) −
V (x, β, [g]∞) ≥ δx.
Proof
Consider realizations of the two processes Q and Q˜ under Coupling 1. Assume that
there are initially x customers ahead of both C in Q and C˜ in Q˜. Assume also that all
other customers in Q are using the same threshold population joining policy pi = [g]∞
and all other customers in Q˜ are using the same threshold joining policy pi = [g˜]∞,
where g˜ > g.
First suppose that 0 ≤ g < g˜ ≤ 1. The sojourn times of the marked customers in
the two processes will differ only if there is a disparity in the queue lengths during
their stay in the systems. A customer is admitted into the queue of either process only
if the queue is empty just prior to arrival. Clearly, however, the marked customer will
have left by then, thus establishing (i).
Let s1 be as defined in Lemma 4.2. Now suppose that 1 ≤ g < g˜, and let Rx de-
note the set of realizations for which X(s1) = L and X˜(s1) = L + 1. If L < L˜,
then Rx would include for example realizations in which no customers arrived during
the service periods of the first x customers, all these x customers departed following
service, L customers arrived during the (first) service period for C (and hence C˜), and
q < UL < 1. If L = L˜, then Rx would include for example realizations in which
no customers arrived during the service periods of the first x customers, all these x
customers departed following service, L customers arrived during the (first) service
period for C (and hence C˜), and q < UL < q˜. Thus Rx has positive probability. Note
that the event Rx is independent of the number of visits K that C and C˜ make to the
server and that P (K = 2) = p(1− p).
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For realizations in Rx with K = 2, C departs Q at s2 one service period ahead of
C˜ and the expected extra time C˜ spends in Q˜ in that case is E(W ). From Lemma 4.2,
in all other realizations C completes all its services either level with C˜ or at least one
service period ahead. Thus, taking expectation over all possible realizations, we have
V (x, β, [g˜]∞)− V (x, β, [g]∞) ≥ p(1− p)P (Rx)E(W ) = δx > 0. ¤
We now introduce a third coupling which we will use to show that the expected sojourn
time V (x, β, pi) is continuous in g for symmetric threshold policies [g]∞. The coupling
is designed to ensure that the queue length in Q˜ is no less than that of Q.
Coupling 3 Set S0 = S˜0 = β, T = T˜ , W = W˜ , U = U˜ , F = F˜ . ¤
Under Coupling 3, the successive arrival epochs Ak and A˜k are the same in both sys-
tems; the successive service completion epochs Sk and S˜k are the same, at least until
one or other system is empty; and the successive feedback variables are the same.
However, although the successive joining variables Uk and U˜k are the same, the suc-
cessive arrival joining decisions will not necessarily be the same. Ck joins Q if and
only if Uk ≤ uk(X(Ak)), and similarly for C˜k. Thus the arrival joining decisions may
differ in cases when the queue sizes X(Ak) and X˜(Ak) differ, or when the queue sizes
are the same but the actions specified by the decision rules uk and u˜k differ.
Now consider realizations of the processes in Q and Q˜ under Coupling 3, with g =
L + q and g˜ = L + q˜, such that 0 ≤ q < q˜ < 1, such that g˜ ∈ [0, B). This means
that service and arrival events are identical under both processes, except that at queue
length L an arriving customer in Q˜ has a probability (q˜ − q) of being accepted when
the corresponding customer is rejected in Q. The strategy will be to construct an upper
bound on V (x, β, [g˜]∞)− V (x, β, [g]∞) which can also be shown to tend to 0 as g˜− g
tends to 0.
Theorem 4 Consider a GI/G/1 Bernoulli feedback system and let [g]∞ be a symmet-
ric threshold population joining policy with g ∈ [0, B). Then V (0, [g]∞) is a continu-
ous function of g, and, for each x = 1, 2, . . . and β > 0, V (x, β, [g]∞) is a continuous
function of g.
Proof
Consider realizations of the two processes Q and Q˜ under Coupling 3, and policies
[g]∞ and [g˜]∞, respectively, where g and g˜ are as defined in the paragraph preceding
the statement of this theorem. Assume that there are initially x customers ahead of C
and C˜ in their respective systems. From Theorem 3 part (i), continuity holds trivially
on the interval [0,1]. Thus assume that 1 ≤ g < g˜. By the coupling, C and C˜ complete
their first service at the same epoch (s1 = s˜1). For k = 1, 2, . . ., let Ek denote the set
of realizations for which C and C˜ complete their first k services at the same epochs
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(so s1 = s˜1, . . . , sk = s˜k) but complete their (k + 1)-st service at different epochs
(sk+1 6= s˜k+1). Let E0 denote the remaining set of realizations for which C and C˜
complete all their services at the same epochs, so E0, E1, . . . form a partition of the set
of all possible realizations.
Because the two systems start in identical initial states and are coupled to have the
same sequence of inter-arrival and service times, a realization in Ek (k ≥ 1) occurs
only if C is fed back at least k times, C and C˜ have exactly the same service comple-
tion epochs sr, r = 1, . . . , k, and there is at least one arrival in the period (sk−1, sk)
who joins the system in Q˜ but not in Q; i.e. this customer arrives when there are L in
both systems and has a joining decision variable U with q < U ≤ q˜.
Let E1k denote the event that C is fed back at least k times and C and C˜ have ex-
actly the same first k service completion epochs sr, r = 1, . . . , k. Let E2k denote the
event that there is at least one arrival in the period (sk−1, sk) who joins the system in
Q˜ but not in Q, and let D denote the difference in the sojourn times of C and C˜. Then
Ek ⊂ E1k ∩ E2k so P (Ek) ≤ P (E2k |E1k)P (E1k) and E(D) =
∑∞
k=1E(D|Ek)P (Ek) ≤∑∞
k=1E(D|Ek)P (E2k |E1k)P (E1k).
Given that Ek happens, any difference in the sojourn time is due only to the differ-
ence between their sojourn times from sk onwards. Since there can be at most L + 1
customers in each system, the expected time C spends in the system between each
service completion epoch is at most (L+ 1)E(W ) and the expected number of passes
through the system after sk is 1/(1 − p), so the expected sojourn time of C from sk
onwards is no greater than (L+ 1)E(W )/(1− p). Arguing similarly for C˜, E(D|Ek)
is at most 2(L+ 1)E(W )/(1− p).
Also, E1k occurs only if C is fed back at least k times, so P (E1k) ≤ pk.
Finally, we derive a bound on P (E2k |E1k) as follows. Consider an arrival process that
starts with an arrival at time t = 0. Let Z denote a random variable independent of the
arrival process whose distribution is the same as that of the sum of L+ 1 independent
service times, and let Y denote the number of arrivals in the closed interval [0, Z].
Clearly Y is almost surely finite (Feller 1966) so∑∞r=0 P (Y = r) = 1.
Now consider a realization in E1k , so C and C˜ are both fed back together to the end
of their respective queues at sk−1 = s˜k−1 and have the same k-th service completion
epoch sk = s˜k. Since the population joining rules are threshold rules with threshold
values of the form g = L + q and g˜ = L + q˜, the total number in each queue will be
at most L+ 1 and so the time sk − sk−1 until their next service completion will be no
more than the sum of L+1 independent service times and so will be stochastically no
greater than Z. Moreover, the first subsequent arrival will occur after sk−1 so the num-
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ber of arrivals in [sk−1, sk] will be stochastically smaller than the number of arrivals in
the interval [0, sk − sk−1] for an arrival process that starts with an arrival at t = 0, and
this will in turn be stochastically no greater than Y . Thus if M denotes the number
of arrivals to (both) Q and Q˜ in [sk−1, sk], then M is stochastically smaller than Y .
Since [1 − (q˜ − q)]Y is strictly decreasing in Y (by noting that [1 − (q˜ − q)] < 1),
E([1− (q˜ − q)]M) ≥ E([1− (q˜ − q)]Y ).
Let U1, U2, . . . be a sequence of independent random variables each with a Uniform
distribution on (0, 1]. Think of Ur as the joining variable of the r-th arrival after sk−1.
Now given E1k occurs, E2k fails to occur if all joining decisions are the same in both
systems in the interval [sk−1, sk], which will follow if Ur does not lie in the interval
(q, q˜] for the r-th arrival in the interval, r ≥ 1, since X(s+k−1) = X˜(s˜+k−1). Thus, using
the fact that the Ur are independent of all other variables, we have that for a given q
and q˜,
1− P (E2k |E1k) ≥ P (M = 0) +
∞∑
r=1
P (M = r,
r⋂
j=1
{Uj /∈ (q, q˜]})
= P (M = 0) +
∞∑
r=1
P (M = r)P (
r⋂
j=1
{Uj /∈ (q, q˜]})
= P (M = 0) +
∞∑
r=1
{1− (q˜ − q)}rP (M = r)
=
∞∑
r=0
(1− (q˜ − q))rP (M = r)
=
∞∑
r=0
(1− (g˜ − g))rP (M = r)
= E[(1− (g˜ − g))M ].
It follows that P (E2k |E1k) ≤ 1−E[(1− (g˜−g))M ] ≤ 1−E[(1− (g˜−g))Y ]. However,
|(1 − (g˜ − g))Y | ≤ 1 and (1 − (g˜ − g))Y −→ 1 as g˜ − g → 0 almost surely (using
the fact that Y is almost surely finite). Hence, by the dominated convergence theorem,
E[(1− (g˜ − g))Y ] −→ 1 as g˜ − g −→ 0, and thus P(E2k |E1k) −→ 0 also. Thus
E(D) =
∞∑
k=1
E(D|Ek)P (Ek)
≤
∞∑
k=1
E(D|Ek)P (E2k |E1k)P (E1k)
≤ [1− E([1− (g˜ − g)]Y )][2(L+ 1)E(W )/(1− p)]
∞∑
k=1
pk
→ 0 as g˜ − g → 0.
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¤5 Individual Nash equilibrium and social optimality
So far, we have looked at joining decisions for an isolated Bernoulli feedback queue.
We now assume that the cost of balking upon arrival to Q is some constant value θ.
We can think of θ as the time spent (or, alternatively, the cost of) using a ’private’
or self-service system which is slower than Q, in the sense that θ is greater than the
total expected time spent at the server for each customer in Q. More precisely, it will
be assumed that 1/µ(1 − p) < θ; this condition says that it is always optimal for a
customer to join Q if there are no customers in the system upon arrival, and there will
be no further customers joining the system in the future. The joining decision depends
only on the observed number of customers at Q on arrival. Customers who join Q are
not permitted to renege during their sojourn, nor are those who balk permitted to join
Q at a later stage.
We consider first what happens when customers make their own individual joining
decisions and each customer is only interested in minimizing their own expected so-
journ time, or cost. Due to the Bernoulli feedback characteristic, the sojourn time of
a particular customer in Q may be affected by the number of customers in the queue
during its sojourn, which in turn is affected by the decisions of subsequent arriving
customers. This problem fits into a game theoretic framework. We derive the Nash
equilibrium solution for the state dependent stationary game that arises and show that
under this regime, the joining rule for each customer has a particular (possibly ran-
domized) threshold form.
We then consider what happens when the joining decision for each customer is made
by a central controller or social optimizer, whose goal is to minimize the overall ex-
pected cost per customer, averaged across customers admitted to Q and those that balk.
In this case we show that there is a deterministic threshold rule which characterizes a
socially optimal joining rule.
Finally, we show that the threshold for the symmetric Nash equilibrium joining rule is
at least as large as the threshold for the socially optimal rule. The interpretation is that,
when other customers use the Nash equilibrium joining rule, it is not to the advantage
of any particular customer to change their joining rule, even though the Nash equilib-
rium joining rule produces greater congestion in Q and greater overall average sojourn
times than the socially optimal rule.
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5.1 Individual Nash equilibrium
For customers who join Q, the sojourn time is given by the time interval between
arrival at, and departure from, the system. For a GI/M/1 Bernoulli feedback system
the expected sojourn time depends only on the population joining policy and the queue
size on joining. Consider a customer Ck who arrives to find x customers already in
Q when the population joining policy is pi. Let Vk(x, pi) denote the expected sojourn
time for customer Ck if they decide to join the system when there are already x in the
system and the population joining policy is pi. The overall expected time/cost spent to
customer Ck if it invokes the joining rule uk is
uk(x)Vk(x, pi) + (1− uk(x))θ.
Consider an arbitrary population joining policy pi = (u0, u1, u2, . . .). Each cus-
tomer wishes to minimize their own expected sojourn time, or cost, in the light of the
actions of other customers. The expected cost customer Ck if they join Q when the
queue size is x is Vk(x, pi) and their expected cost if they decide to balk is θ. Thus we
follow Ben-Shahar et al. (2000) in defining a joining rule uk to be a best response for
customer Ck against the policy pi if:
uk(x) =

1 if Vk(x, pi) < θ
qx if Vk(x, pi) = θ
0 if Vk(x, pi) > θ
(4)
where 0 ≤ qx ≤ 1 is arbitrary. A population joining policy pi = (u0, u1, u2, . . .) is said
to be a Nash equilibrium if, for every k ∈ N, uk is a best response for Ck against pi.
Thus no customer can gain by changing their own joining rule while other customers
continue to use the Nash equilibrium policy. More precisely, for arbitrary k ∈ N, the
overall cost to Ck cannot be further minimized by replacing uk with another joining
rule.
Theorem 5 Consider aGI/M/1 Bernoulli feedback system and assume that attention
is restricted to the class D∞ of non-increasing population joining policies.
(i) If pi = (u0, u1, u2, . . . , . . .) ∈ D∞ is a Nash equilibrium population joining policy,
then each uk is a threshold joining rule (with finite threshold).
(ii) There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium population joining policy pi∗ =
(g∗, g∗, g∗, . . .) = [g∗]∞ in the class of policies D∞.
Proof
Let pi = (u0, u1, u2, . . . , . . .) be a non-increasing population joining policy. From
Corollary 3.1 we have that, for each k ∈ N, Vk(x, pi) is a strictly increasing function
of x ∈ N, with Vk(x, pi)→∞ as x→∞.
Further, Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 together imply that Vk(x, [g]∞) is constant for
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g ∈ [0, 1], strictly increasing in g ∈ [1, B), and continuous for g ∈ [0, B), for each
k ∈ N and x ∈ N.
Without loss of generality, we focus attention on customer C0, and consider the point-
to-set mapping
G∗(g) = {g′ ∈ [0, B] : [g′] is optimal for C0 against [g]∞}.
If it were the case that V0(n, [0]∞) = θ for some n ≥ 0, then V0(n, [g]∞) = θ for
any g ∈ (0, 1] also, due to the constancy of V0(·, [g]∞) in this region. However, this
would imply that the graph of G∗(·) would include the set of points in the box with
corners (0, n), (0, n + 1), (1, n + 1), and (1, n). Non-intersection of this box with the
line of unit slope, with the possible exception of (1, n), can be guaranteed provided
that V0(0, [0]∞) < θ; however, this is equivalent to the condition that 1/µ(1− p) < θ.
The rest of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 from Altman & Shimkin (1998). ¤
The results of Theorem 5 are somewhat less general than their counterpart in Alt-
man & Shimkin (1998) in that pi is restricted to lie in D∞. The class D∞ infers that
there is less chance that each customer enters Q as the queue length there increases
(which perhaps is not unreasonable). Nevertheless, we find that we can extend our
result, under additional assumptions on the arrival process, to the class of S∞.
Theorem 6 Consider an M/M/1 Bernoulli feedback system.
(i) If pi = u∞ ∈ S∞ is a Nash equilibrium population joining policy, then u is a
threshold joining rule (with finite threshold).
(ii) There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium population joining policy pi∗ =
(g∗, g∗, g∗, . . .) = [g∗]∞.
The proof of Theorem 6 is exactly the same as Theorem 5, except that it invokes
Theorem 2 rather than Corollary 3.1.
5.2 Social optimality
We shall now look at the behaviour of the system when the joining decision for each
customer is made by a central controller or social optimizer, on the basis of the queue
length at Q just prior to the arrival of the customer. Again, customers who are not
permitted to join Q will instead experience a fixed cost of θ. The goal of the social
optimizer is to minimize the overall expected cost/sojourn time per customer, averaged
across customers who are permitted to join Q, and those that are refused entry.
Let J(X(An), an) represent the expected sojourn time of the n-th customer to arrive
at the service facility when there are X(An) customers in Q just prior to its arrival, the
social optimizer takes decision an, and where the decisions of future arrivals are gov-
erned by the policy pi (for conciseness of notation, this will be understood to coincide
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with the policy over which expectation is taken in the cost function below). Without
loss of generality, actions could be defined so that an = 1 corresponds to the customer
being admitted intoQ, and an = 0 to it being refused entry. In cases where the decision
at time An is randomized, we can set an = 0, since the costs under both alternatives
are equal.
Defining
φpi(i) = lim
n→∞
inf Epi
[
∑n
i=0 J(X(An), an)|X(0) = i]
n+ 1
then the social optimizer looks for a policy pi∗ such that
φpi∗(i) = minφpi(i) for all i ∈ N.
Theorem 7 (i) Suppose Q is a GI/M/1 Bernoulli feedback system, where the service
time distribution at each visit to the server is exponential with mean 1/µ. Then there
exists a non-randomized threshold control rule, say with threshold Ns, that is socially
optimal in the class of all (stationary) joining rules.
(ii) If the inter-arrival times are also exponential, say with mean 1/λ, and if ρ =
λ/µ(1− p) < 1, then Ns is the socially optimal threshold if and only if
[Ns(1− ρ)− ρ(1− ρNs)]
(1− ρ)2 ≤
µ(1− p)
θ
<
[(Ns + 1)(1− ρ)− ρ(1− ρNs+1)]
(1− ρ)2 . (5)
Proof
In Q the service time distribution at each visit to the server is exponential with mean
1/µ, so the total service time distribution (which excludes the time waiting for service)
for each joining customer is again exponential with mean 1/(1−p)µ. Under any given
centrally imposed joining rule for Q, the queue length process in Q is equivalent to
that for a GI/M/1 system (say Q̂) with the same joining rule but where each customer
takes all their service periods consecutively, where their service time distribution is
exponential with mean 1/(1 − p)µ. Thus the distribution of the queue length as seen
by an arriving customer, the evolution of the joining decisions, and the expected so-
journ time averaged over all customers that join the system, have equivalent behaviour
for Q and Q̂ (even though, for each x, the expected sojourn times for customers that
join when there are x customers in the system Q will differ from the corresponding
quantities for Q̂). Hence the overall sojourn time, or cost, – averaged across customers
who are admitted to the system and those that are refused entry – is the same for Q and
Q̂, and so the socially optimal joining rule is the same for both models.
The existence of a non-randomized socially optimal threshold control rule then fol-
lows from Theorem 6 of Yechiali (1971), where the quantity Wn used in relation (15)
of that paper corresponds to −J(X(An), an) here. For future reference, let us denote
the corresponding threshold by Ns. When the inter-arrival times are also exponential,
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say with mean 1/λ, equation (5) characterizing the actual value of Ns can be estab-
lished in a similar way to relation (22) in Naor (1969). ¤
5.3 Comparison of Nash equilibrium and socially optimal policies
The Nash equilibrium population joining policy and the socially optimal joining policy
described above are both threshold policies. In this section we show that the threshold
Ns used by the socially optimal policy is no greater than the threshold g∗ used by the
Nash equilibrium policy.
If the social optimizer admits or rejects customers to Q according to the threshold
control rule characterized by Ns, then this is exactly the same as the customers volun-
tarily adhering to the symmetric threshold joining policy [Ns]∞.
The proof of the following Lemma is based on the observation that under an appropri-
ate coupling, if Ns were greater than g∗, then the queue length process associated with
the first threshold would be greater than or equal to that of the second threshold, and
showing that this leads to a contradiction.
Theorem 8
Assume g∗ ∈ [0, B).
(i) Suppose Q corresponds to the GI/M/1 Bernoulli feedback system. Then Ns ≤ g∗,
where [g∗]∞ is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium joining policy in the class D∞.
(ii) Suppose Q corresponds to the M/M/1 Bernoulli feedback system. Then Ns ≤ g∗,
where [g∗]∞ is the unique Nash equilibrium joining policy in the class S∞.
Proof of Theorem 8
We define 2 processes:
the Ns-process:- where all customers use the policy [Ns]∞, and
the g∗-process:- where all customers use the policy [g∗]∞,
with the queue lengths initially equal to each other in the two processes.
Suppose for contradiction that Ns > g∗, where Ns ∈ [0, B). Consider these two
processes under Coupling 3.
Denote quantities associated with the socially optimal policy by an ’s’ and those by the
Nash equilibrium with a ’*’.
It is easy to show that
X∗(t) ≤ Xs(t) for all t ∈ [0,∞). (6)
As An is almost surely finite, J(X(An), ·) is well-defined for each n ≥ 0. Since
corresponding customers (i.e. those with the same subscript index) across the two
processes arrive at the service facility at the same time, it is sufficient to establish
a dominance relation between the expected costs for each customer between these
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processes. For simplicity, we will denote J(X(An), an) by Jn. The following cases
exhaust all possibilities for the n-th arrival to the system, n ∈ N, i.e. customer Cn:
(a) Customer admitted into Q under both processes. Then
J∗n = Vn(X
∗(An), [g∗]∞) ≤ Vn(Xs(An), [g∗]∞) < Vn(Xs(An), [Ns]∞) = Jsn.
where the first inequality follows from (6).
(b) Customer rejected under both processes.
Then clearly
J∗n = J
s
n = θ.
(c) Customer admitted into Q under the g∗-process but rejected under the Ns-process.
J∗n = Vn(X
∗(An), [g∗]∞) ≤ θ = Jsn
where the inequality follows from the fact that [g∗] is the best response against [g∗]∞.
(d) Customer admitted into Q under the Ns-process but rejected under the g∗-process.
J∗n = θ ≤ Vn(X∗(An), [g∗]∞) ≤ Vn(Xs(An), [g∗]∞) < Vn(Xs(An), [Ns]∞) = Jsn.
The first inequality follows from the fact that [g∗] is the best response against [g∗]∞, the
second from (6) and the monotonicity of Vn(x, ·), and the third from the monotonicity
of Vn(·, [g]∞).
Now consider the sequence of states (X∗(An), Xs(An)), n ≥ 0, embedded at the
arrival epochs. Clearly, this is a Markov Chain with a finite state space and with a
single positive recurrent set Z = {(i, j) : 0 ≤ j − i ≤ Ns − L′; i ≤ L′}, where
L′ = L∗ + 1{q∗ > 0}. Furthermore, the states in Z are aperiodic (since, for example,
the state (0, 0) is a member of Z , and is aperiodic); therefore, for n sufficiently large,
there exists an 0 < ε < 1 such that the event Dn = {(X∗(An), Xs(An)) = (0, 0)}
occurs with a probability of at least ε; thus case (a) occurs with at least probability
ε for sufficiently large n. However, the inequalities of case (a), in conjunction with
Theorem 3, can be used to show that Jsn − J∗n ≥ δ > 0, where δ = inf{δx : x =
0, 1, . . . , Ns − 1} (noting that g∗ ≥ 1). Hence, upon taking total expectations of Jsn
and J∗n, we see that the socially optimal policy performs strictly worse than the Nash
equilibrium threshold, giving the required contradiction.
¤
6 Concluding Remarks
The analysis of this paper shows that, within the sub-class of symmetric policies that
are characterized by a non-increasing joining rule, D∞∩ S∞, there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium for the GI/M/1 Bernoulli feedback system. We also show that
within the entire class of symmetric policies, S∞, but under the additional assumption
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of exponentiality for the inter-arrival times, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
Under both of these regimes, the Nash equilibrium is characterized by a (possibly
randomized) threshold joining rule. By a utilization of known results for the GI/M/1
queue, we establish (i) the existence and uniqueness of a joining rule, to be used by
each customer, that minimizes the long-term expected average cost per customer, (ii)
that the rule is characterized by a non-randomized threshold, and (iii) that a Nash
equilibrium will admit a customer into the system whenever the socially optimal one
does.
It is unclear, at this stage, however, whether the monotonicity results of Section 3
hold outside the class of policies so far considered. No counter-example is available at
present to suggest that they do not hold outside the class.
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